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A SUMMARY OF THE SEC STUDY ON
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS
Christine Lazaro1
I.

Introduction2

For some time, there has been a debate over what the appropriate
standards of care are and should be for both broker-dealers and investment
advisers. The standards vary based on where the investment professional is,
where the customer is, what types of services are being offered and what
responsibilities are assumed. Across the country, there is a complete lack of
uniformity. Congress considered this when drafting the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 3 . Accordingly, pursuant to
Dodd-Frank, Congress required the SEC (the “Commission”) to conduct a
study to examine the current standards of care for both brokers and
investment advisers and determine if there were any gaps in the current
system. On July 27, 2010, the Commission sought public comment to
evaluate “the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of care
for brokers, dealers, investment advisers, and persons associated with them
when providing personalized investment advice and recommendations about
securities to retail investors; and whether there are gaps, shortcomings, or
overlaps in legal or regulatory standards in the protection of retail customers
relating to the standards of care for these intermediaries.”4 In response, the
Commission received over 3,000 individual comments and over 500 form
comments. The Commission also met with a number of groups, including
PIABA.
1. Christine Lazaro is a Supervising Attorney in the Securities Arbitration Clinic at
St. John's University School of Law, where she supervises students who represent
investors in arbitration claims against brokers. Ms. Lazaro also serves as
chairwoman on PIABA's SRO/Legislation Committee and is a member of the New
York State Bar Association's Securities Litigation and Arbitration Committee.
2. Members of PIABA’s Dodd-Frank Fiduciary Standard Subcommittee contributed
to the summary, specifically, Hugh Berkson, Glenn Gitomer, Christine Lazaro,
Jeffrey Pederson, Howard Rosenfield, Henry Simpson, Mindy Steuer, Bill Young,
and the Chairman of the subcommittee, Joe Peiffer.
3. P.L. 111-203.
4. S.E.C. Release No. 34-62577; IA-3058, “Study Regarding Obligations of Brokers,
Dealer, and Investment Advisers”, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/
2010/34-62577.pdf.
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The Commission issued its report, the “Study on Investment Advisers
and Broker-Dealers” (the “Study”), to Congress on January 21, 2011.5 The
Study examined fourteen different items, as directed by Dodd-Frank. The
final product was 208 pages long. It examined the current landscape of
regulation of both broker-dealers and investment advisers; it looked at the
perceptions of investors; and made recommendations. The Study
recommended enactment of a uniform fiduciary standard that would apply to
both broker-dealers and investment advisers when providing personalized
investment advice about securities to a retail customer. The intricacies and
the details of this recommendation will be discussed in further detail below.
What follows is a summary of the Study, beginning with the substantive
section of the Study, section II. To the extent practical, the headings below
following the headings included within the Study. The recommendations
referenced and the opinions discussed are those included within the Study,
and are not necessarily shared by the contributors to this article.
II. Overview of the Current Business and Regulatory Landscape
A. Current Business Landscape for Investment Advisers and BrokerDealers
The Study’s description of the investment adviser regulatory framework
reveals that every regulation stems from the fundamental concept that
investment advisers maintain a fiduciary standard obligating them to put their
clients’ interests before their own. Accordingly, every possible conflict must
be revealed so that the client is well informed before hiring the investment
adviser, much less accepting the investment adviser’s advice.
The Study’s description of the broker-dealer framework is very different.
The key in the difference in the Study’s view of investment advisers and
broker-dealers is encapsulated in the following quote from the Study:
“Under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and SRO rules,
including SRO rules addressing just and equitable principles of trade, brokerdealers are required to deal fairly with their customers.”6 This statement,
while at first blush innocuous, reveals the key. Per this statement, the Study
presumes that broker-dealers are under no obligation to put their customers’
5. “Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers”, available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
6. See, the Study, p. 50.
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interests first. Rather, broker-dealers are simply obligated to treat their
customers fairly. The Study notes that the duties and obligations have been
developed through Commission and SRO pronouncements, rules, interpretive
decisions, opinions, enforcement action orders and, finally, common law.
The Study concedes that common law may impose a fiduciary duty under
certain circumstances, depending on state law. The Commission and SRO
structure does not itself impose or recognize a fiduciary duty for brokerdealers.
1. Investment Advisers
Investment advisers provide a wide range of advisory services to both
individuals and institutions. According to the Study, there are more than
11,000 investment advisers registered with the Commission, and they
manage more than $38 trillion for more than 14 million clients. There are an
additional 275,000 investment adviser representatives registered with states,
and more than 15,000 state-registered investment advisers.
Of the
Commission registered investment advisers, 75% manage individual and
small business portfolios. Approximately 92% of the assets under
management were in discretionary accounts.7
Investment advisers also manage portfolios of pooled investment
vehicles. Investment advisers may provide financial planning and pension
consulting services, sponsor or manage wrap fee programs, and publish
periodicals or newsletters. Over 95% of the registered investment advisers
charge fees to clients based on the percentage of assets under management.8
2. Broker-Dealers
Broker-dealers handle accounts for both retail and institutional investors.
According to the Study, at the end of 2009 broker-dealers held approximately
110 million customer accounts. The Commission oversees approximately
5,100 broker-dealers with over 600,000 registered representatives. Of the
5,100 registered firms, 985 have indicated that they engage in, or expect to
engage in, investment advisory services. 9
7. See, the Study, pp. 6 – 7.
8. See, the Study, p. 7.
9. See, the Study, p. 8.
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The products and services offered by broker-dealers fall into two broad
categories, brokerage services and dealer services. The Study defines a
broker as one who acts as an agent for someone else, and a dealer as
someone acting as principal for its own account. Broker-dealers may offer a
variety of both brokerage services and dealer services. Broker-dealer
compensation is generally transaction-based, earned through commissions,
mark-ups and mark-downs, and sales loads. There is no charge for advice
that is incidental to the transactions.
The Study recognizes that broker-dealers offer services to a broad range
of retail customers, which may include inexperienced investors seeking basic
brokerage services and recommendations as well as investors with aggressive
investment objectives or unique situations seeking sophisticated investment
strategies.
3. Dual Registrants
Many financial services firms offer both investment advisory and brokerdealer services. Approximately 5% of Commission registered investment
advisers reported that they were also registered as a broker-dealer, and 22%
reported that they had a related person that was a broker-dealer.
Approximately 18% of FINRA registered broker-dealers were also registered
as investment advisers. Approximately 37% of FINRA registered brokerdealers had an affiliate engaged in investment advisory activities.
Approximately 88% of investment adviser representatives were also FINRA
registered representatives.10
The Study indicates that a number of large financial services firms
reported that some of their customers maintain multiple types of accounts
and relationships with them. Some of these customers may receive advice
from “dual-hatted” personnel that are subject to both investment adviser and
broker-dealer regulations. This may provide some benefits for the customers,
but may also raise conflicts for the dual registrants that need to be managed.

10. See, the Study, p. 12.
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B. Commission and SRO Regulation of Investment Advisers and
Broker-Dealers
1. Investment Advisers
a) Overview of Commission Regulation
The Advisers Act was the last in the series of federal statutes which were
meant to eliminate the abuses that Congress believed led to the crash of 1929
and the Depression. The objective of the Advisers Act was to protect
investors against wrongdoing by those paid to provide advice.
A person or firm who falls within the definition of “investment adviser”
must register under the Advisers Act unless either it is exempt from
registration or is prohibited from registering. Investment advisers register
under the Advisers Act by completing a Form ADV.
Investment advisers may use persons to help solicit clients and
prospective clients for advisory services. Because of the inherent conflicts of
interest that exist in the investment adviser – solicitor relationship, they must
enter into a written agreement requiring the solicitor to make certain
disclosures to prospective clients.
b) Regulation Related to the Provision of Personalized
Investment Advice to Advisory Clients
The Supreme Court has construed the Advisers Act as establishing a
federal fiduciary standard which governs the conduct of investment advisers.
According to the Study, the fiduciary standard applies to the entire
relationship between the investment adviser and the client. Fundamental to
the federal fiduciary standard are the duties of loyalty and care. The duty of
loyalty requires an investment adviser to serve the best interests of his
clients. The duty of care requires that an investment adviser make a
reasonable investigation to determine that it is not basing its
recommendations on materially inaccurate or incomplete information.
The investment adviser must fully disclose to its clients all material
information that is intended to eliminate, or at least expose, all conflicts of
interest (or potential conflicts of interest) which might incline an investment
adviser to offer advice that was not disinterested.
Investment advisers are restricted when entering into principal and
agency-cross trades with their clients. If an investment adviser acts as
principal on its own account, it must disclose to its client prior to the
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transaction being completed the capacity in which it is working, the
compensation it is receiving and obtain the client’s consent. With regard to
agency-cross trades, the investment adviser need not receive transaction by
transaction consent, but rather may obtain blanket consent which is renewed
annually.
Investment advisers owe their clients the duty to provide suitable
investment advice. The investment adviser must disclose its investment
process to clients, including its methods of analysis and investment
strategies. Investment advisers also have the duty to seek best execution for
transactions where the investment adviser has the responsibility to select
broker-dealers to execute trades, such as when the account is a discretionary
account. Investment advisers are also prohibited from using any
advertisement that contains any untrue statement of a material fact or is
otherwise false and misleading.
Commission registered investment advisers are subject to record-keeping
rules. Additionally, investment advisers must have established supervisory
procedures which are designed to prevent violations of the federal securities
laws and their rules and regulations. Investment advisers must also adopt a
written code of ethics. On the Form ADV, investment advisers must disclose
information about the disciplinary history of the firm and its personnel.
When an investment adviser has authority to vote a client’s proxies, the
investment adviser must cast the proxy votes in a manner consistent with the
best interests of the client. Investment advisers must disclose to clients how
they are compensated for their services. Moreover, investment advisers must
charge fees that are fair and reasonable, and must disclose if the adviser’s fee
is higher than others. When an investment adviser enters into an advisory
contract with a client, the contract may not be assigned without the client’s
consent. To the extent a contract contains a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clause, the language in the contract must be clear that such clause does not
constitute a waiver of any right provided in the Advisers Act.
Investment advisory clients generally do not have a private right of
action for damages and other monetary relief against the investment adviser
under the Advisers Act, however, clients have a limited private right of
action to void the contract and obtain restitution of fees paid. Clients may
seek to enforce claims against an investment adviser under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) to the extent there is fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Clients may also pursue
state common law or statutory claims against investment advisers.
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2. Broker-Dealers
a) Overview of Commission and SRO Regulation
The Exchange Act generally requires broker-dealers to register with the
Commission and an SRO. Associated persons must also, as a general rule,
register. Finders, those intermediaries who “find” potential investors, must
also register. Before approving the membership application, the SRO must
consider the firm’s ability to: adhere to the applicable rules and regulations,
maintain sufficient capital to operate; maintain financial controls; put in
place and effectuate a sufficient compliance and supervisory structure; keep
proper records; and enforce continuing education standards. The SRO must
also consider any other information it has that would lead to a conclusion that
the applicant may fail to adhere to the rules and regulations. Broker-dealers,
as opposed to investment advisers, need not maintain a stated ethical code.
b) Regulation Related to the Provision of Personalized
Investment Advice and Recommendations to Retail
Customers
Where the investment adviser framework is based on the fiduciary duty,
the law and custom applicable to broker-dealers is based on fairness. The
Study addresses the duty to treat clients fairly in some detail. The discussion
serves to highlight the difference between such a duty and a fiduciary one.
For example, the Study indicates that the antifraud provisions of federal
securities law impose a duty for the broker-dealer to deal fairly with a client.
The Study states: “Actions taken by the broker-dealer that are not fair to the
customer must be disclosed in order to make this implied representation of
fairness not misleading.”11
SRO rules obligate broker-dealers to observe “high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.” In practical
terms, the broker-dealer must:
• have a reasonable basis for the recommendation in light of a
customer’s financial situation to the extent known to the broker
(suitability);
• engage in fair and balanced communications with the public;
• provide timely and adequate confirmation of transactions;
11. See, the Study, p. 51.
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• provide account statements;
• disclose conflicts of interest;
• receive fair compensation both in agency and principal transactions;
and
• give customers the opportunity to arbitrate their claims.
FINRA is imbued with the power to enforce these “just and equitable
principles of trade.”
The Study addresses the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act,
noting that they broadly prohibit misstatements or misleading omissions of
material facts, and fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. If there is to be a
fiduciary duty imposed, it stems from common law. The Study describes the
instances in which courts will find the existence of a fiduciary duty:
“Generally, courts have held that broker-dealers that exercise discretion or
control over customer assets, or have a relationship of trust and confidence
with their customers, owe customers a fiduciary duty.”12
According to the Study, the extent of the broker-dealers’ duties stems
from the nature of the relationship with the customer. For example,
addressing conflict of interest disclosures, the Study notes that if the brokerdealer processes orders but does not recommend securities or solicit
customers, the material information to be disclosed is narrow and relates only
to the consummation of the transaction. Such a broker-dealer would not have
to disclose information about the security or its own economic self-interest in
the transaction. But, if the broker-dealer recommends a security, it must
“give honest and complete information,” and must disclose “material adverse
facts of which it is aware.” 13 Generally speaking, when recommending a
security, the broker-dealer must disclose its own economic interests in the
trade, such as whether it will be acting as a principal; third-party
compensation paid; whether there is revenue sharing for a mutual fund; and
the expenses related to the class of security offered. The Study concludes
that such disclosures “allows customers to verify the terms of their
transactions and provides disclosure on potential conflicts of interest.”14
Certain conflicts are acceptable if disclosed (i.e., third party
compensation, broker-dealer control, interest or affiliation in the security
offered, and conflicts arising from analyst recommendation of securities).
However, there are also conflicts that cannot be disclosed away. Broker12. See, the Study, p. 54.
13. See, the Study, p. 55.
14. See, the Study, p. 57.
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dealers cannot recommend securities they themselves issue, nor can they
provide gifts or payment to gain securities business. Broker-dealers cannot
borrow money from or loan money to a customer unless there are written
procedures in place addressing such transactions. Regulation M generally
prohibits those with an interest in an offering from engaging in certainly
activities during the security’s distribution (in order to avoid price
manipulation). Broker-dealers are also prohibited from extending credit to
allow customers to buy new issues – thereby discouraging the manufacture of
a high demand for the offering.
A broker-dealer’s duty to only recommend suitable securities stems from
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and the SRO rules.
Suitability determinations are fact-specific. The Study seemingly
distinguishes an offer from a recommendation: “The more individually
tailored the communication to a specific customer or targeted group of
customers about a security or group of securities, the greater likelihood that
the communication may be viewed as a ‘recommendation.’” 15 Reading
between the lines, it seems that the Study would not find a suitability
obligation for securities offered, but not recommended.
The Study addresses what it deems three approaches to suitability under
common law: reasonable basis suitability, customer specific suitability and
quantitative suitability. Under the first, the broker-dealer must have
investigated the security and have adequate information concerning the
security recommended. Under the second, the broker-dealer must make
inquiry concerning the customer and make a recommendation based on the
customer’s response. The third requires a broker-dealer that maintains actual
or de facto control over a customer account to have a basis to believe the
amount of trading in a customer’s account is suitable. In other words,
churning is a quantitative suitability issue.
Broker-dealers must charge fair and reasonable prices, violations being
deemed violations of the antifraud provisions. For example, undisclosed
equity markups of more than 10% are deemed fraudulent. Lower markups
can be considered fraudulent depending on the circumstances. Markups on
debt securities in excess of 4 to 5% are probably fraudulent. “Unfair or
unreasonable” underwriting compensation is fraudulent and broker-dealers
are obligated to disclose all underwriting compensation in a prospectus. In
essence, all aspects of a firm’s compensation are subject to scrutiny –
including non-cash compensation.

15. See, the Study, p. 60.
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The broker-dealer’s duty of fairness extends to best execution. While the
security price is the dominant factor, other factors are considered in
determining best execution, including the order size, speed of competing
markets, trading characteristics of the security, availability of information
regarding competing markets, availability of competing markets, and cost of
access to competing markets.
In its communications with the public, broker-dealers must avoid
misleading statements which would violate the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws. Such communications must be “fair and balanced.” 16
Communications must include material facts and qualifications, not predict
or project performance, or make exaggerated claims. Certain broker-dealer
communications must be filed with FINRA for approval. For example, a
broker-dealer’s first year of communications must be approved. Preapproval
is also required for registered investment companies, CMOs, security futures
and bond mutual funds including bond mutual fund volatility ratings. Other
communications must simply be filed with FINRA, such as advertisements
regarding registered investment companies, public direct participation
programs and government securities. The Study notes that 99,000
communications were reviewed by FINRA in 2008. Of these, 476
investigations were performed regarding 2,378 separate communications.17
There are various administrative requirements applicable to brokerdealers, such as the records retention requirements. Broker-dealers must also
maintain a certain amount of net capital. The purpose of net capital is
described: “to protect customers and other market participants from brokerdealer failures and to enable those firms that fall below the minimum net
capital requirements to liquidate in an orderly fashion without the need for a
formal proceeding or financial assistance from SIPC.”18
The administrative requirements described in the Study also include the
broker-dealer’s supervision and compliance systems. Broker-dealers must
not only establish policies and procedures reasonably designed to detect and
prevent violations of laws and regulations, but they must actually enforce
those policies and procedures. The policies and procedures must be tested on
an ongoing basis to ensure they work.
The supervision obligations must include supervision of outside business
activities. Associated persons with outside business relationships must
disclose them to the broker-dealer for approval. Such relationships are
16. See, the Study, p. 71.
17. See, the Study, p.72.
18. See, the Study, p. 73.
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acceptable unless they interfere or compromise the associated person’s
responsibilities to the broker-dealer and its customers, or if it would be
viewed by the public as part of the broker-dealer’s business. Broker-dealers
may prohibit outside business activities if circumstances so warrant.
Additionally, there are testing and continuing education requirements for
associated persons. Customer complaints must be maintained and reported
under the requisite rules. Forms BD and U4 are used for the disclosure of
certain disciplinary and complaint information.
The Exchange Act provides a private right of action, but violations of the
act require proof of scienter. Under Section 17(a) and 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
a misrepresentation or material omission, made with scienter, must be
demonstrated. The Study distinguishes violations of FINRA rules, which do
not contain a scienter element. The Study explains the difference: “[W]hile
the suitability obligation under the federal securities laws arises from the
antifraud provisions, the SRO rules are grounded in concepts of ethics,
professionalism, fair dealing and just and equitable principles of trade, which
gives SROs more authority in dealing with the suitability issues.”19
The Study properly concludes that arbitration is the de facto standard
because of the opening account documents used by almost all firms.
Arbitrations commonly are based on rule violations, without the scienter
requirement. While the SRO rules don’t provide a private cause of action in
court, plaintiffs often use them to establish a standard of care in the
negligence context. SRO rules require that awards be paid within 30 days,
with the revocation or suspension of membership serving as a penalty for
failure to make payment.
C. State and Other Regulation of Investment Advisers and BrokerDealers
1. Investment Advisers
a) Overview of State Regulation Intended to Protect Clients
Most small investment advisers are prohibited from registering with the
Commission and, instead, are registered and regulated by state regulators.
States also retain authority over Commission registered investment advisers
under state investment adviser statutes.
19. See, the Study, p. 62.
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States generally impose requirements upon state-registered investment
advisers that are similar to those imposed by the Advisers Act, however, the
requirements do vary by state. States also generally impose registration,
licensing or qualification requirements on the investment adviser
representatives who are doing business within the state.
b) Other Federal and State Regulation Intended to Protect
Advisory Clients
Certain investment advisers are subject to ERISA if they exercise
authority or control over the management or disposition of employee benefit
plans which are subject to ERISA, provide investment advice for a fee with
respect to the plan assets, or have discretionary responsibility or authority to
administer a plan.
2. Broker-Dealers
a) Overview of State Regulation Intended to Protect Retail
Customers
The Commission has non-exclusive jurisdiction over broker-dealers.
Every state requires broker-dealers and their agents to be registered with or
licensed by the securities regulators of the states in which they conduct
business. If an existing customer is temporarily in another state, the brokerdealer need not register with that state. States may also impose bonding, net
capital, custody, financial statement reporting, and recordkeeping
requirements on broker-dealers, however, they must conform to federal law.
b) Other Federal and State Regulation Intended to Protect
Retail Customers
Broker-dealers are generally not considered fiduciaries for ERISA
purposes, as traditional recommendations would not be considered
investment advice under ERISA. A broker-dealer may be considered a
fiduciary under ERISA if it exercises discretion beyond that permitted under
the regulations.
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Retail Investor Perceptions and Confusion Regarding Financial
Service Provider Obligations and Standard of Conduct

The Commission had been studying retail investor perceptions of the
standards of care applicable to investment advisers and broker-dealers and
their representatives through survey evidence and focus groups for a number
of years.
The Study notes that baby boomers control roughly $13 trillion in
household investable assets, over 50% of US household investment assets,
and nearly one in every six Americans will be 65 or older by the year 2020.20
The Study points out that many retail investors do not understand or are
confused by the different standards of care applicable to investment advisers
and broker-dealers and their respective associated persons.
A. Investor and Investor Advocate Comments
Through publicly solicited comments, many investors stated that
they did not understand the standards of care applicable to investment
advisers and broker-dealers, found the standards of care confusing, and were
uncertain about the meaning of the multiple titles used by investment
advisers and broker-dealers.
B. Commission-sponsored Studies
1. Siegel & Gale, LLC and Gelb Consulting Group, Inc. Study
Siegel & Gale, LLC and Gelb Consulting Group, Inc. were retained by
the Commission in 2004 to conduct focus group testing. The focus group
participants had the same issues as those raised by investors in the publicly
solicited comments, namely that they did not understand that the roles and
legal obligations of investment advisers and broker-dealers are different, and
that the different titles used are confusing. The participants also did not
understand terms such as “fiduciary”.

20. See, the Study, pp. 93 – 94.
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2. RAND Report
The Commission retained RAND in 2006 to conduct a study of brokerdealers and investment advisers.
a) Firm Analysis
RAND found it difficult to identify with certainty the business practices
of investment advisers and broker-dealers. RAND noted that it could be
difficult for investors to understand the differences in the services provided
by financial firms as the information was not presented uniformly, with some
firms providing so much information it would be difficult to process and
others providing scant information. RAND found that the firms believed
investors tend to trust a particular firm without necessarily understanding the
firm’s services and responsibilities.
b) Investor Survey
Survey respondents and focus group participants reported that they did
not understand the differences between investment advisers and brokerdealers, and found the titles used confusing. Focus group participants noted
that “the interchangeable titles and ‘we do it all’ advertisements made it
difficult to discern broker-dealers from investment advisers.”21 Participants
also did not understand the legal duties owed to investors by investment
advisers and broker-dealers. “The primary view of investors was that the
financial professional – regardless of whether the person was an investment
adviser or a broker-dealer – was acting in the investor’s best interest.”22
c) RAND’s Conclusion
RAND came to the conclusion that the “financial services market had
become more complex over the last few decades in response to market
demands for new products and services and the regulatory environment.”23
21. See, the Study, p. 98.
22. See, the Study, p. 98.
23. See, the Study, p. 99.
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Therefore, there has been a blurring of the distinctions between investment
advisers and broker-dealers.
C. CFA Survey
Industry advocates and certain industry groups also conducted a survey.
The results of the survey again suggest that investors do not understand the
differences between investment advisers and broker-dealers, nor do they
understand that there are differing standards of conduct related to each.
D. Conclusion
The Study indicates that, based on the comments, studies and surveys,
investors do not understand the differences between investment advisers and
broker-dealers. This is compounded by the fact that many retail investors
may not have the “sophistication, information, or access needed to represent
themselves effectively in today’s market and to pursue their financial
goals.”24 The Study concludes that “it is important that retail investors be
protected uniformly when receiving personalized investment advice or
recommendations about securities regardless of whether they choose to work
with an investment adviser or a broker-dealer. It is also important that the
personalized securities advice to retail investors be given in their best
interests, without regard to the financial or other interest of the financial
professional, in accordance with a fiduciary standard.”25
IV. Analysis and Recommendations
A. General Differences in Investment Adviser and Broker-Dealer
Regulation
As discussed above, investment advisers and broker-dealers are subject
to different regulations. Investment Advisers are fiduciaries to their clients
and are regulated under the Advisers Act. There is generally a principlesbased approach to regulating investment advisers. An investment adviser
24. See, the Study, p. 101.
25. See, the Study, p. 101.
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must eliminate, or at least disclose, all conflicts of interest that might incline
an investment adviser to render advice that is not disinterested.
Broker-dealers are typically not fiduciaries to their clients except in rare
instances. Broker-dealers are governed through the Commission’s antifraud
authority in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act as well as SRO
rules based on Exchange principles. Theirs is characterized as a
predominantly rules-based approach that focuses on rules embodying
principles of fairness and transparency to relationships between brokerdealers and their customers. Federal securities laws and SRO rules address
broker-dealer conflicts in three ways: express prohibition, mitigation, and
disclosure.
B. Standards of Conduct
The main difference in the standard of conduct between the two is that
investment advisers are held to a fiduciary duty and broker-dealers generally
are not. The fiduciary duty of an investment adviser includes both the duty
of loyalty as well as the duty of care. On the other hand, a broker-dealer’s
standard of conduct is primarily characterized as an obligation to deal fairly
with customers and to observe high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade. Broker-dealers are also subject to a number
of specific obligations including a duty of suitability, as well as requirements
to disclose certain conflicts.
The Commission Staff believes the differences are significant and not
well understood by retail customers. Investors generally expect that an
investment professional is acting in their best interests. With this
background in mind, the Commission Staff made the following
recommendation26:
The Commission should engage in rulemaking to implement the uniform
fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers
when providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers. Specifically, the Staff recommends that the uniform fiduciary
standard of conduct established by the Commission should provide that:
the standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers, when providing personalized investment advice about
securities to retail customers (and such other customers as the
Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in the best interests
26. See, the Study, pp. 109 – 110.
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of the customer without regard to the financial or other interests of
the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.
The Study states that such a standard would not have any direct bearing
on other persons who may be characterized as fiduciaries other than
investment advisers and broker-dealers. In addition, the uniform fiduciary
standard would overlay on top of the existing investment adviser and brokerdealer regimes and would supplement, and not supplant them. It balances
concerns about the impact of regulatory change on investor access to lowcost products and services by not per se eliminating particular products,
services, or compensation schemes.
C. Implementing the Uniform Fiduciary Standard
The uniform fiduciary standard should contain, at a minimum, the duties
of loyalty and care that are encompassed in the duty as it is applied to
investment advisers. The Commission Staff recommends that the
Commission provide guidance on the components of the uniform fiduciary
standard through both rule making and interpretive guidance.
1. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty is a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary standard
under the Advisers Act. To comply with the duty of loyalty, broker-dealers
would have to eliminate or disclose material conflicts of interest.
Commission-based compensation does not violate the fiduciary standard.
Nor does the fiduciary standard require that a broker-dealer have a
continuing duty of care or loyalty after providing personalized investment
advice.
a) Disclosure
The Staff recognizes that there are various disclosures currently made by
both investment advisers and broker-dealers at different times throughout the
relationship with the customer. The Staff also recognizes that the disclosures
need to be clear and consistent. The Staff recommends a uniform approach
to disclosure that would provide the customers of both investment advisers
and broker-dealers key information at the outset of the relationship and at
appropriate times thereafter.

72

PIABA BAR JOURNAL

[Vol 18 No 1

The Staff also recommends that the Commission explore the utility and
feasibility of a summary disclosure document that would describe in clear,
summary form, a firm’s services, charges, and conflicts of interest. The Staff
believes it is the firm’s obligation, and not the customers’, to ensure that
material conflicts of interest are fully, fairly and clearly disclosed so that they
are understood. The Staff recommends that the Commission consider
whether certain conflicts should be prohibited, and when it may be
appropriate to impose specific disclosure and consent requirements.
b) Principal Trading
Dodd-Frank section 913 (g) required the Commission to consider a
fiduciary standard no less stringent than Advisers Act Sections 206 (1) and
(2), however, it omitted 206 (3), which refers to principal trading. The Staff
interprets this as a Congressional intent not to mandate the restrictions
regarding principal trading against broker-dealers, although the Commission
has the authority to do so.
The Staff recognizes that principal trading has the potential for raising
conflicts of interest. The Staff recommends that, at a minimum, under a
uniform fiduciary standard, a broker-dealer should disclose its conflicts of
interest, but it would not necessarily need to follow the same specific notice
and consent requirements of the Advisers Act. The Staff does recognize that
broker-dealers would remain subject to the obligations related to suitability,
best execution, and fair and reasonable pricing and compensation when
engaging in principal trading.
The Staff recommends that the Commission offer specific rulemaking
and/or guidance as to how a broker-dealer may engage in principal trading
and fulfill its fiduciary duty. The Staff also recommends that the
Commission revisit the principal trading rules as they apply to investment
advisers and determine if those rules should be changed.
2. Duty of Care
Both investment advisers and broker-dealers have duties of care, which
incorporate among other things, a duty to investigate, a duty of best
execution, and a duty to charge reasonable prices. The Staff recommends
that the Commission specify the minimum professional obligations of
investment advisers and broker-dealers under the duty of care, either through
rulemaking and/or guidance.
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The Staff recommends that the Commission develop professional
standards regarding the nature and level of review and analysis that brokerdealers and investment advisers should undertake when making
recommendations or otherwise providing advice. The Staff also recommends
that the Commission explicitly provide that any rulemaking or guidance is
meant to provide a minimum expectation for the appropriate standard of
conduct and would not establish a safe harbor or otherwise prevent the
Commission from applying a higher standard of conduct based on specific
facts and circumstances.
3. Personalized Investment Advice About Securities
The Staff recommends that the Commission define “investment advice”
through rulemaking and/or interpretive guidance. While the Advisers Act
focuses on investment advice, the broker-dealer regulatory regime focuses on
recommendations. Under the uniform fiduciary standard, the term
“personalized investment advice about securities” could be interpreted in a
way that is consistent with the scope and interpretive history of both
regulatory regimes.
At a minimum, the definition should encompass the making of a
recommendation, as developed under the broker-dealer regulation, but should
not include “impersonal investment advice” as developed under the Advisers
Act. Additionally, other actions or communications which would be
considered advice under the Advisers Act should be included in the
definition.
a) Retail Customers
The Staff recommends that the Commission define “retail customer”.
The Staff recommends that the Commission also specify that advice provided
to a group of retail customers under circumstances in which members of the
group reasonably would believe that the advice is intended for them should
be covered by a uniform fiduciary standard. Additionally, the Staff
recommends that the Commission consider whether the standard should be
extended to persons other than retail customers.
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4. Investor Education
The Staff recommends that the Commission continue its investor
education initiatives. The Staff suggests that the Commission design
improved curriculum materials to assist retail investors, sponsor investor
education workshops, and work in partnership with non-profit and
community organizations to implement financial literacy programs designed
to help investors understand the uniform fiduciary standard.
D. Harmonization of Regulations
This section addresses additional areas of differences between current
investment adviser and broker-dealer regulations.
1. Advertising and the Use of Finders and Solicitors
a) Advertising and Other Communications
The Staff has reviewed the differences between investment adviser and
broker-dealer regulations relating to advertising. Current differences include
the following:
 Under certain circumstances, a registered principal of a broker-dealer
must approve a communication before distributing it to the public,
and certain communications must be filed with FINRA for approval.
No such requirements exist for investment adviser communications.
 Specific content restrictions may differ. For example, investment
advisers are prohibited from using testimonials in advertisements and
restricted in using past specific recommendations. Broker-dealers
are not prohibited from using testimonials. As another example,
there is less detailed and extensive guidance regarding the use of
performance information and the circumstances under which
performance information is considered misleading for brokerdealers, than there is for investment advisers.
The Staff recommends that advertising and customer communication
rules and guidance should be made consistent for broker-dealers and
investment advisers. At a minimum, internal pre-use review requirements
should be consistent and/or investment advisers should be required to
designate employees to review and approve advertisements.
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b) Use of Finders and Solicitors
The Staff has reviewed differences in regulations regarding the use of
finders and solicitors. Currently, a solicitor/finder who causes an investor to
retain the services of a broker-dealer must itself register as a broker-dealer.
A solicitor/finder who causes an investor to retain the services of an
investment advisory firm is not required to register as an investment adviser.
However, the solicitor must disclose material conflicts, the adviser has an
obligation to supervise the solicitor, and the adviser must treat the solicitor as
an associated person to the extent the solicitor acts as such. The Staff
recommends that the Commission should consider whether to provide
additional guidance or harmonize existing requirements so as to ensure that
retail customers understand the conflicts associated with solicitors/finders.
2. Remedies
The Staff has looked at the differences in remedies under current law.
Current differences include the following:
 Broker-dealer customers typically are required to arbitrate before
FINRA and FINRA rules require broker-dealers to arbitrate with
customers, and prescribe the content and form of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in customer agreements. No such requirements
exist for clients of investment advisers.
 Broker-dealer customers have private rights of action under certain
provisions of the Exchange Act; investment adviser clients have a
very limited private right of action under the Advisers Act.
 Broker-dealers are required by FINRA rules to pay awards within 30
days of receipt or face suspension or cancellation of membership.
Investment advisers do not face such sanctions.
While the above differences are noted, the Staff does not recommend any
action in this regard because Dodd-Frank section 921 (relating to ending or
limiting agreements which require customers to arbitrate disputes) provides
the Commission with the opportunity to review these issues in greater detail.
3. Supervision
The Staff has reviewed differences in supervisory requirements between
broker-dealers and investment advisers. Broker-dealers have more specific
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supervisory requirements than investment advisers under current law. The
Staff recommends that the Commission should consider adopting a single set
of universally applicable requirements for supervision. Alternatively, the
Commission should consider whether supervisory structure requirements
should be scaled based on the size and nature of the broker-dealer/investment
adviser.
4. Licensing and Registration of Firms
The Staff has reviewed differences in requirements for the licensing and
registration of firms. Currently, investment advisers register on Form ADV
part 1 and broker-dealers register on Form BD. Broker-dealers must also
satisfy FINRA’s membership requirements, which include presenting a
business plan and description of the nature and source of capital, the financial
controls to be employed, the supervisory system and copies of certain
procedures, a membership interview, compliance with applicable state
licensing, establishment of a supervisory system and a membership
agreement. Investment advisers are not subject to this level of review.
The Staff does not believe that requiring a uniform form for both brokerdealers and investment advisers would help to protect investors. The Staff
believes a uniform form would create confusion and be burdensome for firms
who are not already dual registrants. However, in instances where the forms
ask for the same or similar information, they should be made as uniform as
feasible. The Staff believes a more substantive review of investment adviser
registration applications could improve investor protection but it is not
feasible for the Commission to undertake this responsibility without
additional resources. Nonetheless, it recommends that the Commission
consider requiring a more substantive review.
5. Licensing and Continuing Education Requirements for Persons
Associated with Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers
The Staff has reviewed the differences between licensing and continuing
education requirements for persons associated with broker-dealers and
investment advisers. Associated persons of broker-dealers must be registered
with FINRA, disclose their employment and disciplinary histories and keep
such disclosures current, meet qualification requirements to effect securities
transactions and fulfill continuing education requirements. No comparable
requirements exist for investment adviser personnel.
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The lack of uniform federal licensing and continuing education
requirements for investment adviser personnel may be a gap in regulation,
but the Staff recognizes that the Commission does not have the
infrastructure, nor the resources to administer an education and testing
program. However a private organization could develop such a program.
The Staff therefore recommends that the Commission could consider
requiring investment adviser representatives to be subject to federal
continuing education and licensing requirements.
7. Books and Records27
There are currently differences in books and records requirements.
Broker-dealers must retain all communications received and sent and all
written agreements relating to a firm’s business as such. Investment adviser
retention rules are more limited. The Staff recommends that investment
advisers should be required to retain the same books and records as brokerdealers.
E. Alternatives to the Uniform Fiduciary Standard
This section considers the options of repealing the broker-dealer
exclusion and/or imposing the standard of care applied under the Advisers
Act for providing personalized investment advice about securities and other
requirements of the Advisers Act upon broker-dealers.
The Staff recognizes that while the foregoing options could have certain
benefits (i.e. dividing financial services into two categories, simplifying
regulation, helping to reduce investor confusion), any such benefits would be
outweighed by the potential negative outcomes. Such potential drawbacks
include: 1)they could prevent the Commission from evaluating the existing
regulatory regimes and applying the best elements of each to investment
advisers and broker-dealers; 2) they might result in fewer investor choices;
and 3) they would likely be more costly for investors and the industry (see
Section V). The Staff also believes the uniform fiduciary standard would
provide investor protection and be a better approach in achieving uniform
regulation.
27. There is no number 6 in the Study.
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V. Cost Analysis
This section discusses the costs that could be incurred by investors,
broker-dealers, investment advisers, and their associated persons as a result
of the Commission’s adoption of the uniform fiduciary standard. The Costs
Analysis essentially makes the following observations based upon comments,
academic sources, and reports the Commission received:
 Commentators expressed a view that adoption of the uniform
fiduciary standard would generally increase administrative and
compliance costs to broker-dealers.
 Commentators have expressed a concern about the potential increase
in litigation expenses, which may result from the adoption of the
uniform fiduciary standard.
 Commentators have indicated that adoption of the uniform fiduciary
standard would increase insurance costs for broker-dealers.
 The Study noted that application of the uniform fiduciary standard to
broker-dealers might cause them to register as investment advisers
and possibly de-register as broker-dealers. This may result in
brokerage accounts being converted into investment advisory
accounts subject to advisory fees. This conversion may involve
certain upfront fees to the converting customers.
 The Study noted that the industry’s increased compliance and
administrative costs might be passed along to the retail investors and
result in reduced services and products, which may no longer be
profitably provided.
 As a result of these increased costs, broker-dealers might decide not
to sell securities and bonds as a principal, resulting in a lower quality
of execution.
 Custodial fees may be imposed on accounts which are not subject to
an investment advisory fee or accounts may be subject to investment
advisory fees regardless of the level of trading in those accounts,
leading to the potential of “reverse churning.”
 Any additional costs which may be passed on to the retail customer
would negatively impact the profitability of their investments.
Notwithstanding these additional costs and burdens, the Staff
recommends the adoption of the uniform fiduciary standard.

